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Abstract
The predictions that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption have not been
found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work reviews this relationship
by using firms’ data in a cross-country survey and argues that approaches using aggregated
data have not been able to explain it appropriately. Our purpose is, first to model cross-country
variations of the micro-founded economic freedom-corruption relationship using multilevel
models. Additionally, we analyze this relationship by disentangling the determinants for
several components of economic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally.
The results show that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic
freedom for corruption, identified by the degree of economic and institutional development of
a country, can explain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may
yield more corruption. Our conjectures are confirmed by estimations for Africa and transition
economy subsamples.
JEL : H10; H11; H50; K20; O5
Keywords: Corruption, economic freedom, multilevel models
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1. Introduction
The failure of markets is a classic justification for government intervention in the economy.
In reality, governments often intervene in markets that are not at all affected by failure or imper-
fections. Misguided government policies interfering with efficient markets have been a central
concern to economists for a long time and great efforts have been made to document that the
effects of the excess of regulation may cause seeking of privileges, hampering of free private en-
trepreneurial activity, and dejection in international exchanges. This signifies that diminishing
these effects could be sufficient to reduce government intervention.
This perspective has also been extended for corruption phenomena. As argued by Acemoglu
and Verdier (2000), government intervention transfers resources to the private sphere creating
room for corruption. This view also sustains “that extensions of privatization and market com-
petition are an effective cure for a corrupt state”. However, as noted by Hodgson and Jiang
(2007), corruption may be the reason why market failure exists. Interests of powerful sectoral
lobbies can lead policy makers into inefficient actions or make them unresponsive to specific
requests to regulate sectors.
In this line of research, much attention has been recently devoted to testing the relation-
ship between economic freedom and corruption under the predictions that economic freedom is
beneficial in reducing corruption. However, as corruption data are largely available at the ag-
gregate (country) level, existing research has focused on explaining economic relationships in
a cross-country context. Empirical tests have been found in line with the theoretical hypothesis
(Chafuen and Guzma`n, 2000; Paldam, 2002; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Shen and Williamson,
2005; Carden and Verdon, 2010).
We have motivated this empirical paper by recording conflicting evidence that more economic
freedom reduces corruption when economic freedom is regressed on the entire distribution of
corruption, subdivided by its components or when the relationship is tested for subsamples of
countries1. For example, Billger and Goel (2009) show that among the most corrupt nations,
greater economic freedom does not appear to cut corruption. Rather, it may exacerbate corrup-
tion issues indicating that nations respond differently to different levels of economic freedom
because their dimension is associated with the country’s developing conditions. On the other
hand, Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), arguing against the use of an aggregate indicator of eco-
nomic freedom to evaluate their effects, provided support for a counter-intuitive effect of the
size of government, as a specific component of economic freedom, on corruption. There is also
an institutional dimension to explain some unexpected results. Lambsdorff (2007) argued that
the need of government interventions may not be larger than how sustained for retaining some
state interventions to deal with market failures such as “good”government regulations become
relevant in cutting corruption. This implies that the impact of economic freedom or its com-
1See Lambsdorff (2007) for a discussion on the works where the relationship between economic freedom and
corruption is non-significant or where the impact of economic freedom increases corruption
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ponents on corruption may depend on the variability of the government intervention efficiency
across “regulated”and “freedom”countries.
In this paper, we have consider a broadest class of random effect models to investigate the
relationship between economic freedom and corruption, and propose a selective strategy in
which nested and non-nested multilevel models are tested. We have followed the suggestions
originally developed with microdata (firms) in mind by Milgrom and Roberts (2008), and pro-
posed, as explanatory keys, firms’ indices of economic freedom assumed to be linked with
corruption. We have extracted data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and
contributed to the literature by estimating economic freedom determinants of corruption with a
model that identifies and tests cross-countries differences in corruption. We have justified our
empirical choice because some components of economic freedom have a natural micro-founded
relationship with bribe phenomena in economic activities. However, following the theoretical
arguments put forth by Treisman (2000), the relationships of corruption with the components of
economic freedom may also be explained by a number of country characteristics. Our contri-
bution is to model the variability across countries by a multilevel specification with the double
aim to keep the micro-founded relationships robust and identify socio-economic and institu-
tional indicators at the country level responsible for the unexpected theoretical relationships.
Our research is related to a number of empirical papers testing whether more freedom lowers
corruption (Chafuen and Guzma`n, 2000; Paldam, 2002), although we have focused on Graeff
and Mehlkop (2003) framework that considers how specific components of economic freedom
affect corruption. We also find inspiration from a large literature on corruption that undermines
the strength of public institutions and hampers economic growth and development (and vice-
versa). Some classical references include Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Bardhan
(1997), and Me´on and Sekkat (2005). Our work is also related to the empirical analyses that use
microdata to investigate corruption and its determinants (Swamy et al., 2001; Svensson, 2005;
Mocan, 2008). Finally, we refer to the works by Hodgson (2006) and Hodgson and Jiang (2007)
that extend the role of corruption to the private sphere.
We begin our work by documenting the basic facts regarding the key variables of our empir-
ical specification. We then present a multilevel model, a more realistic framework to test the
hypotheses of our work. The remainder of the paper estimates the parameters of the selected
models obtained by the sequential test strategy. Although the results in the full sample are al-
most all in line with the predictions of the standard economic predictions, attention to the firms’
heterogeneous responses and cross-country effects is crucial for explaining the puzzle of hetero-
geneous outcomes when the sample changes. The results highlight that government regulation
interventions in African countries and transition economies may cut corruption, while the large
variability across countries is identified not only by the differences in the economic prosperity,
but also by the country’s efficiency in applying institution rules.
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2. Economic freedom and Corruption linkages
2.1. Basic facts
In empirical studies, many difficulties lie in obtaining proper measures of corruption, which
identify and describe its linkage with the components of economic freedom. By using sur-
vey data, Trasparency International measures the known corruption perception index (CPI),
highly used to describe the dynamics of corruption. As also argued by Gorodnichenko and
Sabirianova Peter (2007), the perception-based indices of corruption do not provide a robust
estimation of bribery within countries. However, these indicators may remain informative for
dynamics or aggregate comparison across countries.
The index published in Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) is designed to measure the
consistency of a nations institutions and policies with economic freedom. The key ingredients of
economic freedom are based on personal choices, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets,
freedom to enter and compete in markets, and protection of persons and their property from
aggression by others. The methodological outline of the index is focused on two important
principles. First, objective components are always preferred to those that involve surveys or
value judgments. Second, the data used to construct the index ratings are from external sources,
such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Economic Forum. Although
economic theory suggest the main links among the five components of economic freedom, there
is no consensus about their relative weights in determining the degree of economic freedom.
On the other hand, economic freedom is designed to represent the degree to which the policies
and institutions of countries intervene in a society (Gwartney and Lawson, 2000). Their magni-
tude can affect individual incentives, productive effort, and effectiveness of resource allocation
(de Haan and Sturm, 2003; North and Thomas, 1973). The official statistics have recorded that
in recent periods, economic freedom has improved. As measured by the index of Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW), the average level increased to 6.6 in 2000 from 5.8 in 1990, and
it has been rising in this first decade of the 21st century as well2.
In Figure 1, the EFW (for 2000) index is displayed as a rough prediction of its effects on cross-
country corruption based on the Transparency International measure. As expected, it does not
show surprising results. As the EFW rises (less) corruption increases linearly.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2 shows the same relationship for a sub-sample of African countries. We found that
a nonlinear hump-shaped relationship fits the data very well. Although using cross-country
regressions with country-level variables of economic freedom and corruption, the expected re-
lationship in subsample should be in line with the prevalent literature (e.g. see Graeff and
2The final score of EFW, available for about 140 countries, is obtained as a weighted mean of five main com-
ponents or areas, which are: i) the size of government; ii) legal structure and security of property rights; iii)
access to finances and sound money; iv) freedom to trade internationally, and v) regulation of credit, labor, and
business.
4
Mehlkop (2003) for subsample estimations) and a prominent role may be played by sectoral
differences of government interventions. In fact, corruption may also arise from sectors with
large economic freedom. As argued by Lambsdorff (2007), not all aspects of economic free-
dom deter corruption, because some regulations may increase the transaction costs of corruption
deals. In these cases, irrespective of whether policy-makers are unresponsive to the demand for
regulation, “free”competition and lack of government regulations should be considered as a
fallacy of policy formulation. When this behavior is associated with a weak legal apparatus of
recognition and enforcement of the state, as recognized in less developed countries, corruption
may strongly emerge because spontaneous mechanisms of economic freedom are conditioned
by local rules that allow imposes on private bribes, frequently as taxation, to improve business.
[Figure 2 about here.]
This leads to another source of issues regarding the use of an economic freedom indicator
in the empirical literature. As shown in Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), the summary index score
of economic freedom competes against its multidimensional representation of freedom. The
existence of ambiguous correlations between components of economic freedom and its aggre-
gate measure as well as the weight of the suppression effects in aggregate may produce biases
in explaining corruption effects. As an extension of Figure 2, it is possible to predict that the
composition effects may be emphasized if we collect data only for developing economies. We
have presented the discussion on these aspects following the next sub-section.
2.2. The components of economic freedom and corruption
We have focused on descriptive statistics of economic freedom and corruption obtained by the
WBES, presenting the description of the dataset in Section 4. Furthermore, we have presented
an exercise by aggregating the firms’ indicators of economic freedom and corruption at the
country level for some components of economic freedom. We have preserved the macro-level
of the data for comparison with the empirical analyses observed in the economic literature3.
We have chosen our variables to be adaptable to the areas of the database “economic freedom
of the world”(Gwartney and Lawson, 2000). Furthermore, we have singled out five principal
areas: (I) market competition; (II) government regulation of private entrepreneurial activity;
(III) ability of the financial system to support private firms; (IV) property rights and the pro-
tection of contracts, and (V) regulation of export4. Within these economic freedom areas, we
have extracted indicators of interest described in Table 1. Figure 3 highlights the results of the
descriptive analysis. Contrary to the scale of the Transparency International index, corruption
3We remark that our aim is to give some descriptive insights to the relation to be tested. This is statistically
equivalent to aggregating all individual level variables to the group level and carrying out ordinary least squares,
e.g. by doing regression over group means. A problem with this technique is that within-group information
variation is lost (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998).
4With respect to Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) the use of WBES micro-data do not allow us to directly include the
size of government that is a variable recorded at aggregate level. We will include it in estimating the multilevel
model
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increases in the y-axis, while economic freedom decreases moving to the right of the x-axis.
As shown in panels a-e, it is not possible to delineate a clear picture concerning the statistical
co-movements between these economic-freedom indices and corruption. Both for market com-
petition (panel a) and government regulation components (panels b-e), the graph dispersions are
not able to confirm the expected relationships suggested by standard theory. Furthermore, these
graphs clearly highlight the existence of grouped countries in the data because the effects of
the components of economic freedom on corruption have not occurred everywhere in the same
way. That is, it emerges that part of the variation of these relationships can be interpreted in
terms of unobserved differences between the countries.
A way to account for the magnitude of these differences across countries is to estimate the
aforementioned relationships by a multilevel framework. As we use the individual firms’ obser-
vations in line with the theoretical micro-founded relationships, we showed that on an average
the economic responses of firms are differentiated across the countries. It is assumed that micro-
data are not completely independent, i.e. the results are affected by these clustered structures
of the underlying data. In other words, the perception of corruption and economic freedom of
firms in the same country is more homogeneous that firms in different countries. In line with
the above classification, we have modeled property rights and protections of contracts at the
microlevel as a condition for firms to legitimate contracts and exchanges, and, in general, the
quality of institutions5.
Without losing generality, a random intercept model was extended to the remaining
economic-freedom components (panel f-h), although they consistently showed that more
freedom in the financial system, export regulation and property right protection lowered
corruption. Therefore, the objective of making general statements about phenomena for a
larger set of groups suggest of assuming a specification in which the intercept varies randomly
across country units (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).
[Figure 3 about here.]
3. Econometric specification
In this section we have provided a comprehensive description of the multilevel probit model.
The interest in these models is a natural improvement to the basic econometric framework when
micro-data contain clusters resulting from non-independent observations. First, if the observa-
tions within clusters are more correlated, then it is more likely that ignoring clustering would
result in biases in estimations and inference. Second, the absence of a behavioral model of eco-
nomic freedom components on corruption makes the analysis essentially descriptive addressing
the use of latent class models.
5A criticism to model the quality of institutions on corruption at the microlevel might be based on the low
variability of preferences and expectations in face to firms. Mocan (2008) developed a model in which it is
assumed that an increase in the quality of the institutions in a country, which would increase the probability of
apprehension, would in turn reduce the propensity to ask for a bribe.
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Let us consider a general formulation of a two-level model. We observed yi j, a binary re-
sponse for corruption propensity within firms i and related to country j and xi j, a set of ex-
planatory variables at the firm level. We assumed that a latent continuous variable yi j∗ exists
underlying yi j. We observed our binary response variable yi j directly, but not yi j∗. We knew
that yi j = 1 if yi j∗ > 0 and yi j = 0 if yi j∗ ≤ 0 . Thus, we can write the multilevel model for
yi j∗ as
yi j∗= β0 j+β1xi j+
H
∑
h=1
βhxi0 + ei j where ei j|xi j ∼ N(0,pi) (1)
where β0 j are country-specific intercepts and β1 is the regression coefficient of each economic-
freedom component. As we wehere interested in assessing the impact of the different typologies
of economic freedom separately, (1) can be considered as a companion matrix that includes the
nine indicators, xi j, in the diagonal and otherwise zero. Furthermore, in (1), we also included
the firms’ fixed effects, xi0, evaluated by the parameters βh, while ei j are the first-level residual
terms. Under the hypothesis of a random-effect model, we can explicit βo j as
β0 j = γ00 + γ01w10 j+u0 j where u0 j|xi j ∼ N(0,ψ) (2)
where γ00 is the intercept and γ01 are the coefficients of the vector of the observed macro-
covariates of the second stage to allow us to identify cross-country variation, w10 j. u0 j is the
random effect of level two related to the country-specific intercept β0 j. The assumption that a
part of the variability of the fit model can be identified by the between-country covariates, w10 j,
does not prevent that the unobserved variability of the country effects may generate dependence
between the firms’ economic-freedom components, xi j. Subsequently, we turn to the specifica-
tion of an extended model that contains parameters associated with issues of endogeneity and
to the implementation of nested restriction tests.
Conditioned to the random effect u0 j, a probit model is specified by assuming that ei j has a
standard normal distribution. It can be commonly observed in this literature that clusters j are
assumed to be independent, the covariance between different firms, Cov(ei jei′ j) = 0, and the
two-level error terms are not correlated, Cov(u0 j,ei j) = 0, such that we can write the reduced
form of the model as6
yi j∗= γ00 + γ01w10 j+β1xi j+
H
∑
h=1
βhxi0 +u0 j+ ei j (3)
By assuming that u0 j is normally distributed, the strategy for estimating the model parameters
is to integrate the unobserved random effect, u0 j,
f (y j|x j,w1j) =
∫
f (y j|x j,w1j ,u0 j)g(u0 j)du0 j, (4)
6The assumption that unobserved country characteristics are uncorrelated with unobserved firm characteristics
excludes non-frequent cases in which firms are very successful in operating in corrupt countries.
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where g(.) represents the normal density function7. As a result, the unconditional estimation
does not determine a closed expression. Maximum likelihood estimation has to resort to ap-
proximation procedures, such as numerical integration. RabeHesketh et al. (2002) proposed
an algorithm by using the posterior mean and variance of the random effects, which are cal-
culated by building on the work by Naylor and Smith (1982)8. If the assumed distribution is
normal, the numerical quadrature approach yields a deviance (ϒ) that can be readily used for
likelihood-ratio tests. This statistic is given as ϒ= 2(ln f (y|ϑ˜)− ln f (y|ϑ̂), where ln f (y | ϑ˜)is
the loglikelihood for the saturated model and ln f (y | ϑ̂) is the loglikelihood for the model of
interest. Some nested specifications can be obtained by the imposition of parameter restrictions
calling for a simple likelihood ratio test on the parameter(s) restrictions,
LR= 2
(
ln f f ull(yi j|θ 6= 0)− ln frestr (yi j|θ = 0)
)
(5)
which has an approximate χ2 distribution with a number of degrees of freedoms equal to the
imposed restrictions on the parameters.
From the multilevel model, there is no insurance that the unexplained variability among dif-
ferent countries’ corruption propensity does not include the effect of omitted macro-variables
related to institutions rules and economic growth indicators, which, in turn, is correlated with
xi j. Hence, we modeled an extended specification of (3) that includes endogeneity issues. Fol-
lowing Snijders and Berkhof (2004), the aforementioned dependence can be expressed as a
regression,
w20 j = α00 +α01x¯· j+ ε0 j (6)
where x¯· j is the cluster mean of xi j. By inserting (6) into (3), the random intercept model
depends on x¯· j, while the reduced form of the model is given as
yi j∗= γ∗00 + γ01w10 j+α01x¯· j+β1xi j+
H
∑
h=1
βhxi0 +u∗0 j+ ei j (7)
where γ∗00 = γ00+α00 and u
∗
0 j = u0 j+ε0 j. The exclusion from the analysis of the cluster mean,
x¯· j, when α01 6= 0, yields a biased estimator of β1.
It is worth noting that control variables for political, economic, and institutional character-
istics of the country, which may also be those correlated with both corruption and economic-
freedom components, reduce the endogeneity yielded by the unobserved components of the
random effect model. As a restriction of the model in (7), we assessed the macro-variables
effects by imposing the vector γ01 = 0. Formally,
yi j∗= γ∗00 +α01x¯· j+β1xi j+
H
∑
h=1
βhxi0 +u∗0 j+ ei j (8)
7For the sake of simplicity, we included the fixed effects of the first level in the intercept parameter (γ00).
8Although marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL) and penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) are largely used in statistical
literature, these are found to generate downwardly biased estimates (Hedeker, 2001).
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Figure 4 summarizes the nested relationships among models, showing the relevant restrictions
on the likelihood function of (7). A sequential strategy of the model selection process can be
implemented reasonably by partitioning the observed and unobserved macro-variates, W0 j =[
w10 j;w
2
0 j
]
. A double route for testing nested models arises with respect to our focus, because it
is not determined a priori if fixed macro-indicators are able to cut endogeneity significantly. By
assuming that the restrictions of the vector of parameters θ1 = θ |γ01 = 0 and θ2 = θ |α01 = 0
are not rejected separately, before passing to the next step and by testing the restricted models
against the benchmark random intercept model, i.e. a model without fixed effects and random
coefficients, we have to decide if a best model exists by identifying the cross-country variation
in the data. By defining the conditional function density for the restricted models, f (y|x,θ1)
and g(y|x,θ2), conventional and adjusted (Vuong, 1989) LR tests were used for these non-
nested specifications (step 2, Figure 4). The null hypothesis of model equivalence, H0 : E[
log f (y|x,θ1)g(y|x,θ2)
]
= 0, was tested against competing model, H1 : E
[
log f (y|x,θ1)g(y|x,θ2)
]
> 0 or H1 : E[
log f (y|x,θ1)g(y|x,θ2)
]
< 0 . If H0 is rejected, in the first case, we prefer f (.) to g(.), and vice-versa
if the result is in line with the second hypothesis. Finally, the best model is tested against the
basic “random effect”model by adding, ∑Hh=1βhxi0 = 0, if the restricted a model with γ01 = 0 or
α01 = 0 was found.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4. Estimations
4.1. Data and empirical models
The data used in the empirical analysis were taken from the Voices of the Firms 2000 of the
WBES, a cross-sectional survey of industrial and service enterprises conducted in mid-1999
by the World Bank and some other agencies. This survey represents the most comprehensive
source of micro-data for analyzing both corruption and economic freedom by firms’ perception
responses. The WBES survey covers 67 countries in which, on an average, more than 100 firms
were interviewed. Appendix 1 reports the list of countries by macro-regions and the specific
number of firms interviewed. This survey provides detailed information on private viewpoints
regarding taxation, government regulation, and financial sector, as well as on perceived corrup-
tion raised from business experience. On the contrary, there is a lack of information concerning
controlled and participated enterprises. Although some information on assets, sales, owner-
ship, employees, and enterprise growth were collected, it is not adequate to fill up detailed
balance-sheet information and profit and loss statements, reducing the possibility to control
firm heterogeneity by economic performances.
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we have used the discrete variable of perceived corrup-
tion as a dependent variable. This index measures “how usual it is for firms to have to pay some
irregular additional payments to obtain a service from the public administration”. This variable
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(from 1 to 6) indicates the increase in corruption perception in the line of business in which it
operates. Response to corruption items offers an interpretation not only concerning the direct
experience, but is assumed to include the behavior of the closest firms in the same environment.
This index also endorses the operational definition of corruption that includes the private sector
and stands in clear contrast with the characterizations of corruption that focus solely on the
public sector. According to Hodgson and Jiang (2007), the role of corruptive phenomena in the
private sector conceptually extends the interactions between the private and public sectors (and
their institutions) and provides different implications of the state intervention on corruption.
In line with the econometric specification discussed earlier, we collapsed this self-reported
categorial indicator to generate a binary variable by grouping the modalities for low corrup-
tion (1-3) and 1 for high corruption in 0 and 1, respectively, to better focus on the highest rank
corruption group9. Thus, the corruption index is assumed to be expressible as a (non)linear com-
bination of each economic-freedom component and variables that account for the firm’s fixed
effects as well as for a set of macro-variables that are able to identify the level (or differences)
of the economic development of the countries.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 reports the description of the covariates selected. The foregoing discussions and
the implementation of tests to choose the adequate model rest on suggestions taken from the
empirical literature, and are intended to break up the determinants of the summary index score
described in Section 2.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Svensson (2005) argue that a positive degree of competitiveness
in a country (AREA I, Table 1) reduces the probability of corruption. In this approach, a non-
competitive market serves to feed corruption, by a rent channel, that consolidates a non-market
system of the bureaucrats’ behavior and constrains the flow of information from a competition
environment out of the firms’ control. Emerson (2006) has presented a model of the interaction
between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical
to competition. As discussed by Lambsdorff (2007), the empirical results are sensitive from
which measure of competition is used.
Subsequently, we tested the hypothesis of a negative correlation between competition and
corruption by using the number of firms as a proxy of competition, because the survey does not
contain an explicit indicator of entry barriers of new firms, except for foreign firms. The limits of
implementing this index are known, specifically in developing countries, where entry barriers
ca be addressed to avoid the entry of foreign firms. As a result, local firms competing with
quality rather than prices are forced to establish myopic behavior, without a specific worldly
wisdom for high-quality reputation. Under these hypotheses, competition may even increase
rather than decrease corruption.
9For a comprehensive review of the aggregate corruption perception indexes, see Kaufmann et al. (1999).
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Among the components of economic freedom, corruption is assumed to be influenced by
government regulation components (AREA II). As some specific effects strictly depend on the
structure and efficiency of the market, it would be wrong to perceive corruption as the conse-
quence of excessive regulation, or to assume that complete laissez-faire will always be the an-
swer (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). The perspective that government regulation hampers productive
effort encourages rent-seeking, and increases the discretionary power of a few public officers,
still reigns throughout government institutions and scholars (Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003; Pal-
dam, 2002), though it is largely recognized that when government regulation is weak or almost
absent, an increase in market rules is crucial to develop a solid productive sector (Hodgson,
2003)10.
These features have at least two important implications when examining corruption practices
in developing country economies. First, results from developed countries should not be directly
extended to developing countries’ settings without a serious reflection upon their differences.
In fact, to the trade-off between benefits and disbenefits of state intervention leading to mar-
ket failures (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000), we have to add the different impacts of negative
externalities of corruption in any context. Second and foremost, empirical research has tended
to focus on the impact of the overall size of the government budget relative to GDP, often ig-
noring the interactions of each government regulation component. The test that the size of the
government is positively correlated with the level of corruption is weak. In fact, Elliot (1997)
and Adsera (2003) obtained contrasting findings, while Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) and Billger
and Goel (2009) reported ambiguous results that can only be slightly disentangled by observing
the relation in a subsample of countries or conditioning the distribution of corruption variable
across the countries, respectively. These evidences also suggest another avenue, i.e. particular
types of government expenditure might have a different potential, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, to cause corruption with respect to the size of the government. Heterogeneity of goods
and services supplied in free market are an important source of transaction costs that may be
reduced by government regulations, though planning these interventions may bring large prob-
lems of corruption. In our empirical analyses, we differentiated the components of government
regulation and control for the levels of development of a country and size of government in
assessing their impact on corruption. The sign and magnitude of the government regulation
indicators on corruption, i.e. government interventions on investments, employment, sales, and
prices become an empirical issue.
It has been postulated that the ability of the formal financial system to provide financing to
the private sector reduces the corruption effects (AREA III). This relationship is unquestionably
mitigated by a different degree (or quality) of financial institutions of the countries. As a result,
10Developing countries are often characterized by weak law enforcement, a large informal sector, underdeveloped
capital markets, and informal credit and insurance networks. For example, informal arrangements, such as
family networks of credit and insurance, have been found to very much influence the impact of interventions,
limiting the beginning of corruption.
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low levels of the country’s quality of financial institutions may yield a reverse causation of the
estimated relationship. Safavian et al. (2001), investigating the data from small businesses in
Russia, reported that the enterprises, more harried by corruption, also apply more often for
external finance. However, Brunetti et al. (1997), ranking the levels of corruption found that
the second most significant impediment to doing business without corruption is the lack of
financing. We include the effects of financial constraints on corruption that is expected to be in
their pathological or inefficient expression in the developing or transition countries. It is worth
noting that liquidity constraints often emerge in the transition economies, although the financial
system may be able to provide financing for the private sector. A feature of these economies is
that a high level of investment projects, associated with a potentially inefficient financial system,
requires a higher level of intermediation costs. As argued in Ahlin and Pang (2008), these costs
related to the magnitude of investment are directly associated with corrupt payments. On the
other hand, if corruption is costly for firms, it may feed demand for corruption as taxation and
keep these financial constraints in the supply of financing.
The legal system’s ability to protect property right contracts (AREA IV) is widely suggested
as being a policy intervention to reduce corruption in the world economies. Failure of the legal
system to provide for the enforcement of contracts undermines the operation of the free market,
and, in turn, reduces the incentives for agents to participate in productive activities Acemoglu
and Verdier (1998). This implies that corruption increases. In contrast to the current literature,
we have specified a micro-founded relationship because firms are able to account for failures
in operation of the free market and in line with an extended definition of corruption for private
spheres.
Finally, government regulation on export and international trade (AREA V) is assumed to
increase the level of corruption. There are at least three reasons for explaining the hypothe-
sized empirical evidences. First, this effect is linked with the relation between firm rents in
a noncompetitive market and import licensing. Krueger (1974) argued that when the number
of licenses is fixed, the firm is encouraged to compete to obtain the largest amount of trade
licensing. A rational firm may shift productive plans to rent intensive activities and could turn
to bribing transactions to win trade licensing. Second, trade barriers may be in favor of inef-
ficient local firms than foreign competitors, and forms of corruption may easily arise. Finally,
import barriers create an artificial scarcity of specific commodities, channelling a part of the
non-competitive higher prices towards corrupt bureaucrats that, in developing countries or tran-
sition economies, may lead to underground economies. The empirical evidence has provided
questionable support of a negative sign in the relation between the extension of international
trade and corruption (Treisman, 2000; Torrez, 2002).
In empirical applications, the first level of (3), (7), and (8) is usually assumed to be a function
of firms’ factors affecting corruption rather than the specific economic-freedom components. As
largely discussed by Beck et al. (2002), the extent of corruption effects depends on the firm’s
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size, as well as on its legal organization and the sector in which it operates. These variables are
included in all model specifications as fixed effects within the countries.
Thus, we have justified the specification of multilevel (economic) models because the cor-
ruption perception of firms and its relation with economic-freedom components depends on
country’s economic conditions and is also constrained and molded by institutions’ (in Hodgson
sense) self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating characteristics. It is assumed that the random in-
tercept model is determined by (macro) country factors, leaving to the statistical significance of
the means of the economic-freedom indicators to check mutual interaction and interdependence
(endogeneity)11. A set of these indicators in this work are assumed to explain an unobserved
variability induced by the differences across country development. Traditional macroeconomic
indicators are the gross domestic product per-capita (GDP)12, the private investment share in
GDP (INV ), and the Gini-coefficient of distribution of income (GINI). In the multilevel model,
we also included the share of government spending in GDP (GOV ). As shown by La Porta et al.
(1999), the size of the state and its quality represent a key variable to explain the differences
across countries of good governance.
In addition, we included the civil liberties index (CIVIL) as a proxy of the level of democracy
in a country (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). It is known that a strong democratic regime enforces
the reliability of public action, decreasing the firms’ market power and reducing illegal profit
gains13. The relevance of including this indicator for our analysis is justified because the rise of
democracy is found to decrease corruption (Emerson, 2006), and, in general, economic growth
(Bardhan, 1997; Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005). This leads to assume that as democracy increases,
corruption seems to fall, irrespective of the level of corruption of a country. However, the sig-
nificant impacts of democracy on economic-freedom components are well known (Lundstrom,
2005). It is worth noting that as the quality of the institutions has a direct impact on corruption,
the very low level of the civil liberties index in developing countries decreases the possibility
of controlling for the legal system’s ability to protect property rights and prevent corruption. It
is not difficult, in turn, to predict a reduction in the certainty of property rights (Acemoglu and
Verdier, 1998), though endogeneity issues may consequently arise in estimations.
4.2. Results
The choice of the most appropriate specification consists of testing, for each equation, the
models presented in Section 3 and summarized in Figure 4. Parsimonious models are obtained
by placing the relevant restrictions on the likelihood function and are interpreted as special
11This assumption makes the investigated statistical relationships symmetric. However, as sustained by Archer
(1995), these relationships may be asymmetric because institutions typically precede the activities of individu-
als.
12We have used capital letters to distinguish the macro-variables.
13Treisman (2000) suggests, among other things, that more developed and more long-standing democratic coun-
tries are less corrupt.
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cases of endogenous multilevel probit model (7). Conventional and adjusted likelihood ratio
formulation is reported in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
In the first row, model (7) is tested against model (8) in which macro-effect restrictions are
imposed (i.e. γ01 = 0). The results of the LR test for the nine econometric specifications cor-
responding to each economic-freedom variable clearly reject the hypotheses tested and indicate
that these variables are relevant in identifying corruption differences across countries. On the
contrary, as shown in the second row, we never rejected the endogeneity restriction, α01 = 0,
because the empirical LR test is always lower than the critical value at the usual percentile. To
complete the analysis, we tested model specification (3) against the basic random effect model,
in which fixed micro-effects and country identifying variables are restricted to zero (βh = 0 and
γ01 = 0). The LR test rejects the restricted basic model confirming that (3) is the best model to
rationalize the data. The Voung test (1989) completes the selection strategy by testing exoge-
nous random effect model (3) against non-nested random effect model with endogeneity (8).
The Vuong test statistic leads to the rejection of models equivalence for each specification and
to favoring the model in (3). If we evaluate the restrictions from the endogenous random effect
model, with firm-fixed effects restricted, the test provides further support to the model chosen
(Table 2, row five).
[Table 3 about here.]
The maximum-likelihood estimates are presented in Table 3. We remark that the use of
a multilevel approach instead of a normal logit regression insures that we avoid misleading
significance effects due to violations of the assumption of independent errors with a constant
variance. This effect has been confirmed in our regression results, in which the multilevel re-
gressions display lower levels of significance when compared with the logit regression with
the same model specification14. To support this result, we reported the intra-class correlation
(ρ) for each estimated specification. For each equation, about 30 percent of the total variabil-
ity of corruption is attributable to the countries’ heterogeneity. We identified this source of
variability in the relationship by the indicators of the second level discussed in the previous
section. Although there were considerable differences in the magnitude of the coefficients, both
significance and direction of the influence were in conformation with the majority of cases. Ac-
cordingly, the degree of economic prosperity is capable of explaining gains in the efficiency of
the economic and social system and controlling for corruption (Mauro, 1995). The hypothesis
that high-income inequality corresponds to perceptions of unfair state operations and makes the
incidence of corruption more likely (Smelser, 1971) seems yo be confirmed. Furthermore, the
importance of civil liberty index in reducing corruption is in line with theoretical expectations,
14Estimation results obtained on these subsamples are available from the authors.
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while an oversized state affects the efficiency of expenditure and corruption seems to increase
irrespective of its level.
Analogous to the country characteristics, we found very consistent patterns at the firm level,
except the legal organization of the firm. The probability of corruptive practices in bigger firms
is pervasively found to be 12-13 percent lower, independent of the economic freedom equation
used. Contrary to that, the industrial sector is found to have a higher (on an average, 5 percent)
propensity to experiment corruption, possibly reflecting better market independence of services
to cope with smaller businessmen on starting and/or developing economic activities.
Government regulations on investment, employment, sales, and prices increase corruption
(Table 3, columns 2-5). Inefficiencies caused by an over-regulated economic system seem to be
able to distort private productive activity and influence corruptive behaviors. Because of the crit-
ical role that the labour market plays in the process of economic development (Caballero and
Hammour, 2000; Foster et al., 2002; Bartelsman et al., 2004), understanding whether labour
market regulations actually help or hinder corruption phenomena stands out as an important
task. Although very similar effects are found across countries when looking at individual com-
ponents of government regulations, we register that protection of employment has the highest
propensity (0.131) in affecting corruption. As expected, where labour market institutions are
developed, adding government employment regulations can weigh down the processes of agree-
ment and facilitate corruption practices obtained while mediating among firms, workers and
unions. Similarly, the other government regulation indicators significantly affect the reduction
of corruption.
In columns 6 and 7, we present the estimated outcomes related to financial market constraints.
As expected, according to the compositional effects of countries with different degrees of finan-
cial development, we found that constraints in private and public financing projects increase the
probability of corruption, while quite surprisingly, financial systems’ efficiency do not seem to
affect it. Our estimations also comply with the general knowledge on the importance of trade
regulation in increasing corruption found by the works of (Ades and Di Tella, 1997, 1999), Sung
and Chu (2003), and Gerring and Thacker (2005).
So far, the largest and most significant effect on corruption is exerted by the legal system
to protect property rights and contracts (−0.218). We found that limiting the possibility to
confiscate private property or repudiating contracts produces positive externalities, and seems
to determine general improvements in the quality of institutions. However, as discussed in
Glaeser et al. (2001) this result strictly depends on the difficulty in enforcing complex private
contracts and on the potential advantages of a parallel developed framework for organizing
private transactions.
In contrast, we found no significance in the degree of competition. As discussed earlier, the
effects on corruption of the competition level among firms is uncertain. Heavy competition
could incite them to pay commissions to make up for their weak negotiating power and get
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market shares, as well as a lower competition incites them to anticipate significant rents and
pay bribes to acquire new markets. We anticipate that for the subsamples of countries, heavy
competition, when associated with restrictions on trade, may determine an increase in corrup-
tion.
We test the robustness of our results considering two subsamples, Africa and a sample of tran-
sition economies of the Eastern Europe. We justify this strategy because comparing the level
of corruption of African economies with the rest of the world is traditionally argued base on
the fact that these shortfalls of ”good” behavior are the result of differences in infrastructures,
macroeconomic mismanagement and, weak administrations that affect the micro-founded rela-
tionships investigated. For example, following Transparency International for the years around
2000, the corruption index for the African region is about 3.35/10, while the world mean is
about 4.00/10. Furthermore, the transition countries are an interesting case study because of
their choice to pass to a freer market economy and democratic regimes during the 90s (i.e. tran-
sition economies). As reported in the work by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), with the exception of
Estonia, Transparency International rates the most former communist countries as being highly
corrupt. On the other hand, although the liberalization policies in transition countries have been
extremely relevant during last decade, the same source of data records lesser economic-freedom
(5.5/10) with respect to the world mean (6.23/10). A specific determinant has been linked with
the reforms in public-sector activities, namely privatization, which did not achieve one of their
objectives (in 2000 and even after that year) to reduce corruption15.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
We again ran the selection strategy reported in Figure 4. We could confirm an exogenous
multilevel specification for almost all the corruption equations of these subsamples, except in
cases where endogeneity is relevant. In these cases, the need of including the mean of the firms’
variables to account for these issues is suggested (Tables 4-5, row 2).
Tables 6 and 7 present the maximum-likelihood estimates. Quite surprisingly, we found
that significant residual variance of the second level exceeds 20 percent in many equations of
Africa, showing that country’s variability plays a relevant role in explaining corruption. This
is also the case of transition countries, although the significant variation of the intercept of
country level is on an average slightly more than 10 percent. Covariates at country level have the
15The main cause of this failure is clearly discussed by Hodgson and Jiang (2007) who indicated that “under the
communist regimes, informal economic networks often spanned and surpassed ethnic divisions. But political
crises and economic recessions.....have inhibited the establishment of a market system with clear and general
rules .... affecting economic legality ”. Specifically, the privatization process in the former USSR, characterized
by the sale of state assets, was marked by an increase in corruption because many ideas of traditionalism were
upheld and not included in the decisional process criteria of rationality and effectiveness. This offered an
opportunity to accumulate illegal fortunes (Sachs, 2005).
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expected significant effects in most cases, with some exceptions. Neither GDP and CIVIL for
African countries nor INV for transition economies have been found to exert a relevant impact
on corruption, while large differences of the size of the government appear to explain most of
the country’s variability. Its positive impact emphasizes the thesis that inefficiencies generated
by a wide expenditure feed corruptive practices as a misuse of recurrent government budget.
Additionally, we anticipate that the inclusion of the country mean of the explicative variables
(i.e. employment regulation and property right protection for Africa and sales regulation and
financial constraints for transition economies) can generate loss of their significance.
The estimated relationships for these subsamples point out changes in government regulation
components, suggesting that these government interventions are more likely to hinder corrup-
tion. In line with Elliott’s (1997) argumentations, these results confirm that the types of govern-
ment activities provided can directly affect corruption and indirectly control for the size of the
state expenditure.
Not surprisingly, we found a positive impact of the degree of competition on corruption. This
result is affected by the latent presence of trade barriers that are able to favor local firms and
activities, and yield a greater propensity to corrupt bureaucrats. In sum and in line with the
findings of Gupta et al. (2001), more competition among prevalent local firms, which also share
similar norms and rules, incites them to pay commissions to enhance their profitability.
The negative sign of property rights strengthens the perception that institutional rules help to
sustain economic activities and reduce corruptive phenomena in African countries. As expected,
the control for endogeneity produces insignificant estimated coefficients for GOV and CIVIL.
This implies that not only properly functioning property right rules, but also sustained political
interventions are necessary to improve the issue related to corruption and defend the structure
of institutional rules, because they do not guarantee the absence of large social costs.
However, in the model regressions that include endogeneity, the micro-founded relationships
can also show an opposite sign in the estimated coefficient, with respect to those of the country-
mean. This is evident for government regulation on employment for Africa as well as sales
in transition economies. While the costs of corruption for Africa are difficult to be reduced
by micro-regulation of employment (as shown by the insignificant value of the coefficient),
minimization of corruption will depend on the effectiveness of institutional labour designs and
net of the development level of a country. On the contrary, transition economies may internalize
advantages of sales regulation on corruption by applying policies that do not give incentives for
an efficient regulation on sales assignments that cuts the costs of corruption.
As suggested by the strategy tests, the financial system’s financial constraints in transition
countries are estimated with the additional country-mean regress. The significance of this pa-
rameter, together with that at the firm level, strengthens the idea that better financial systems
are beneficial for combating corruption and enhancing economic growth. Although this re-
sult is generally accepted, when we analyzed corruption outcomes for economies in transition,
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they were more complex for the existence of interaction with investments in the private sector.
For example, the lack of institutional rules for the financial system in the former communist
economies, soon after the period of reform, has been grounds for the increasing phenomena of
corruption in growing investments. Thus, the significance of the parameter of private invest-
ments (INV) confirms the hypothesis of detrimental financial system effects on corruption, at
least in the short run.
[Table 6 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
5. Concluding remarks
The standard economic model predicts that government intervention transfers resources from
the private sector and generates room for corruption. If the economic freedom increases suffi-
ciently, then the level of corruption tends to fall and keeps falling as the quality of institutions
continues to increase. This mechanism received support from conventional estimates of the
aggregate economic-freedom indicators though the work by Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) docu-
menting that the response of corruption to the components of economic freedom appears to be
contradictory. Furthermore, the recent corruption literature has emphasized the importance of
micro-founding relationships as an explanation for its determinants (Mocan, 2008).
The purpose of this paper has been to complement previous approaches by estimating cross-
country economic freedom and corruption relationships based on multilevel models. In terms
of the topic that we investigated, our contribution is to simultaneously incorporate the empirical
facts presented in Section 2.2 and to test the the impact of the components of economic freedom
on corruption using the vast sample of firms’ data in developing and developed countries. We
estimated these relationships correcting them for the unobserved cross-country variability. By
identifying indicators of economic prosperity, income distribution and democracy at the country
level, we were able to explain why some countries have higher level of corruption. We estimated
the micro-founded relationships and captured unobserved cross-country variability by removing
the empirical issues linked with aggregate data. At the microeconomic level, we could explain
when government regulation interventions are incentives and when they are discouragements.
Thus, we found that competition may be bad for corruption when entry barriers are high and
will be so in less developed countries.
If combating corruption is one of the main objectives of the incumbent government, this paper
notably suggests that a lack of competition policies and government regulations may actually
yield more corruption in less developed countries, while standard receipts of greater freedom
may be applied in developed countries.
Our model links financial systems or property rights to corruption, which are considered
positive mechanisms for growth. We have answered the question whether these components of
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economic freedom lead to reduce corruption and found that, in general, this hypothesis holds.
Our model also shows a high and significant variability across countries and the inclusion of
identifying country effects makes the relationship more robust and confirms that civil liberties
and the macroeconomic indicators determine greater efficiency in combating corruption.
The line for policy makers’ intervention in less developed countries and transition economies
appears to be clear, although powerful interests, also distant from theoretical discussions con-
cerning the trade-off between government intervention, have influenced the governments to take
no action at all, making them almost unresponsive to answer the need to regulate some sectors.
According to the empirical analysis, outside the developed countries, policies should be ad-
dressed to implement complementary strategy to reduce corruption and costs of the economic
growth, selecting (or not) government interventions within appropriate sectors.
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Table 2. Specification tests, full sample
Competitors Private investment Employment Sales Prices Financial Financial Property right Export
regulation regulation regulation regulation ability efficiency protection regulation
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 905.56 811.83 821.0637 809.92 813.35 904.48 932.81 836.65 896.28
vs. Endogenous model (equation 8) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 0.70 1.33 2.21 1.62 2.14 0.04 1.75 2.70 2.20
vs. Exogenous model (equation 3) (0.40) (024) (0.13) (0.20) (0.14) (0.83) (0.18) (0.10) (0.13)
Endogenous model (equation 8) LRtest 905.56 3326.89 3495.53 3467.49 3514.36 3603.52 2880.63 3753.51 3295.41
vs. Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) LRtest 4450.37 4137.39 4314.38 4275.79 4325.57 4507.96 3715.54 4683.63 4189.50
vs. Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) Vuong 7.93 17.67 18.00 15.47 11.47 8.47 8.05 -3.74 10.17
vs. Endogenous model (equation 8) test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (4.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: We have reported the p− values in parenthesis. The Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models is carried out under standard normal distribution. The extended model (Equation 7)
includes endogeneity, macro- and firm-fixed effects. The endogenous model (Equation 8) includes endogeneity and firm-fixed effects. The exogenous model (Equation 3) includes macro- and
firm-fixed effects.
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Table 4. Specification tests, sub-sample of the African countries
Competitors Private investment Employment Sales Prices Financial Financial Property right Export
regulation regulation regulation regulation efficiency constraints protection regulation
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 516.08 520.87 517.44 516.18 522.39 527.15 472.14 515.48 499.57
vs. Endogenous model (equation 8) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 8.90 0.37 6.58 1.23 0.42 2.80 3.21 6.53 1.61
vs. Exogenous model (equation 3) (0.40) (0.54) (0.01) (0.26) (0.51) (0.09) (0.07) (0.01) (0.20)
Endogenous model (equation 8) LRtest 144.46 355.28 365.61 349.49 347.02 342.25 351.47 395.47 336.40
vs. Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) LRtest 651.63 875.78 876.47 864.45 868.99 866.60 820.41 904.43 834.36
vs. Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) Vuong 43.01 6.61 94.35 75.23 33.69 40.38 23.37 12.93 27.73
vs. Endogenous model (equation 8) test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: We have reported the p− values in parenthesis. The Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models is carried out under standard normal distribution. The extended model (Equation 7)
includes endogeneity, macro- and firm-fixed effects. The endogenous model (Equation 8) includes endogeneity and firm-fixed effects. The exogenous model (Equation 3) includes macro- and
firm-fixed effects.
Table 5. Specification tests, sub-sample of the Transition economies
Competitors Private investment Employment Sales Prices Financial Financial Property right Export
regulation regulation regulation regulation ability efficiency protection regulation
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 259.13 230.42 239.79 244.58 247.68 257.20 241.48 255.47 235.25
vs. Endogenous model (equation 8) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Extended model (equation 7) LRtest 0.00 0.09 0.15 3.58 3.00 0.97 6.20 0.36 1.87
vs. Exogenous model (equation 3) (1.00) (0.76) (0.69) (0.05) (0.08) (0.32) (0.01) (0.54) (0.17)
Endogenous model (equation 8) LRtest 289.90 294.99 298.15 285.59 295.65 294.71 251.08 290.79 271.98
vs. Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) LRtest 549.03 525.32 537.78 526.60 540.33 550.95 486.35 545.90 505.36
vs. Basic model (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exogenous model (equation 3) Vuong 49.99 84.77 85.76 7642 103.51 24.88 18.72 -39.25 31.44
vs. Endogenous model (equation 8) test (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: We have reported the p− values in parenthesis. The Vuong test (1989) for non-nested models is carried out under standard normal distribution. The extended model (Equation 7)
includes endogeneity, macro- and firm-fixed effects. The endogenous model (Equation 8) includes endogeneity and firm-fixed effects. The exogenous model (Equation 3) includes macro- and
firm-fixed effects.
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Table 8. List of countries by macro regions.
country name Africa Mena Transition East Asia South Asia Latin America OECD Total
Albania 0 0 163 0 0 0 0 163
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 50
Belize 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 50
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Botswana 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 101
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 201 0 201
Bulgaria 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 125
Cameroon 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 57
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 101
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
China 0 0 0 101 0 0 0 101
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 101
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Cote d’Ivoire 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 97
Croatia 0 0 127 0 0 0 0 127
Czech Republic 0 0 137 0 0 0 0 137
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0 0 111 0 111
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Egypt. Arab Rep. 0 102 0 0 0 0 0 102
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 104 0 104
Estonia 0 0 132 0 0 0 0 132
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Ghana 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 119
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 106 0 106
Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 103 0 103
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Hungary 0 0 129 0 0 0 0 129
India 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 210
Indonesia 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Kenya 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 113
Lithuania 0 0 112 0 0 0 0 112
Madagascar 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 116
Malawi 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 55
Malaysia 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Namibia 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 95
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Nigeria 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 93
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 103 0 0 103
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 108
Philippines 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Poland 0 0 225 0 0 0 0 225
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Romania 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 125
Russian Federation 0 0 525 0 0 0 0 525
Senegal 124 0 0 0 0 0 0 124
Singapore 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100
Slovak Republic 0 0 129 0 0 0 0 129
Slovenia 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 125
South Africa 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 121
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 104 104
Tanzania 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 83
Thailand 0 0 0 422 0 0 0 422
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 101
Tunisia 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 52
Turkey 0 0 150 0 0 0 0 150
Uganda 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 137
Ukraine 0 0 225 0 0 0 0 225
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 102 102
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Venezuela. RB 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
Zambia 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 84
Zimbabwe 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 129
Total 1,524 154 2,429 923 363 1,985 807 8,185
Figures
Figure 1. Summary index score of economic freedom and corruption
Figure 2. Summary index score of economic freedom and corruption, African countries
Figure 3. Economic freedom components and corruption, full sample
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(b) Private investment regulation (Area II)
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(f) Fiscal market constraints (Area III)
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(g) Property right protection (Area IV)
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Note: The figures are built by aggregating individual data of economic-freedom components and corruption at the country level. The economic-freedom areas used to share economic freedom
components are derived by Gwartney and Lawson (2000). For further information on sources, see Section 4.1.
Figure 4. Strategy for testing nested and non-nested models
